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Unraveling Ethics 
Illuminating the Moral Dilemmas of Research Ethics 
Christine Halse and Anne Honey 
This essay offers a critical, reflective analysis of some of the sticky moral questions that 
can entangle feminist researchers as they work to transform a research proposal into an 
application for ethics committee approval. We write not as philosophers or ethicists but as 
feminist social scientists reflecting on our struggle to do ethical research and to be ethical 
researchers in an environment governed by a regulatory model of research ethics. Our 
story is constructed as two intersecting narratives. In the first section of our essay, "A 
Narrative about Ethics," we relate our account of how ethical theory plays out in the real 
world, drawing on our experience of preparing the ethics applications for an interview 
study with "anorexic" teenage girls and our struggles with two pillars of research ethics 
policy: defining the research population and eliciting informed consent. 1 In the second 
section of our essay, "Ethics in Our Narrative," we tease out the implications of the 
research ethics approval process for the people who participate in research and for those 
who desire to be ethical and moral researchers. 
The enigmatic, gendered character of self-starvation and the unanswered riddle of its 
cause( s) and maintenance has made anorexia nervosa an alluring subject for scholars in 
many disciplines and fields (including cultural studies, women's studies, and media stud-
ies) using a spectrum of perspectives (social, cultural, and biological) and epistemologies, 
from positivism to critical poststructuralism. Amid this enormous corpus of published 
research there is a deafening silence about the ethics of doing research with "sufferers" in 
general or with teenage girls-the most frequently affected group-in particular. 
Our essay seeks to address this glaring gap in the literature while also responding to the 
invocations from other researchers for empirical data and concrete documentation of the 
practice and implications of ethical decision making in human research: "the way ethical 
decisions are actually reached (as opposed to how they should be reached)" (De Vries and 
Subedi 1998, v). 
Our essay also arises from particular, personal agendas: our desire to "do ethics right," 
in terms of both complying with institutional ethics policy and being morally and ethic-
ally responsible to our research participants; our professional commitment to being crit-
ically reflexive about the morality of our interactions with research participants and the 
research ethics process; and a vested interest by one of us, as the chair of an institutional 
ethics review board, to see research ethics policy and ethics committees foster genuinely 
moral behavior and ethical research rather than cultivating cultures of counterfeit 
practice. 
In penning this essay, our aim is to make visible, and therefore revisable, the moral 
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dilemmas embedded in research ethics policy and its implementation by ethics commit-
tees, and to illuminate some of the implications these dilemmas carry for feminist 
research and feminist researchers. Michel Foucault ([1973] 1978) points out that even 
uttering knowledge that diverges from established discourses is a critical activity and an 
act of resistance. In this sense our essay is explicitly transgressive because it seeks to 
unravel the morality of the ethics approval process and the ethics of doing research. This 
is a dangerous but politically necessary conversation. The investments, dilemmas, and 
implications of researchers' ethical decisions and moral choices are usually secreted away, 
buried, concealed, and hidden from public scrutiny, thereby crafting an illusion that 
"good" research is being done by "good researchers." However, it is necessary to make the 
ethics of research transparent in order to identify the moral crevices of ethics policy and 
practice and to develop new and better ways of doing feminist research and being ethical 
feminist researchers. 
I. A Narrative about Ethics 
Constructing the Indefinable Subject 
Anorexia nervosa is a serious social issue and a potentially life-threatening problem affect-
ing approximately 0.5 percent of females, primarily teenagers, and approximately one-
tenth as many males (American Psychiatric Association 2000). Treatment for anorexia 
nervosa is difficult and prolonged. Approximately one-third of sufferers still meet diag-
nostic criteria five years after initial treatment, and studies report mortality rates of 5-8 
percent from starvation or related complications (Polivy and Herman 2002). Even weight-
restored anorexics may experience ongoing medical complications and long-term psycho-
logical and social problems that have a detrimental impact on their quality of life. 
Clinicians and reviewers have criticized the absence of research into the life history and 
lived experiences of people with eating problems (e.g., Leder 1990). A particular gap is the 
absence of systematic, qualitative research about the experience of self-starvation from the 
standpoints of teenage sufferers. Our study sought to redress this silence and to generate 
understandings that might improve prevention and support programs in schools and in 
medical contexts. 
We were well versed (and well rehearsed) in "getting through ethics" and had an 
intimate, insider knowledge about the thinking and machinations of ethics committees, 
accumulated from years of serving on and chairing such committees. We began preparing 
our ethics applications complacently confident that the task would be painless and pedes-
trian. But our interview study posed messy moral quandaries that challenged our ideas 
about the meaning of doing ethical research. 
As a multisite study, our research project required ethics approval from several insti-
tutional ethics committees. In Australia, where we work, the national guidelines and 
policies governing research with humans are generated by the National Health and Med-
ical Research Council (National Health and Medical Research Council 1999). Institutional 
compliance is required by federal law and monitored by the Australian Health Ethics 
Committee. Compliance is an employment condition for academics and a prerequisite for 
the receipt of national research grants. Typically, institutional ethics committees follow 
the ,national protocols, although local committees may interpret these differently during 
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the review process. The protocols parallel those of other English-language countries. They 
include an explanation of the aims, rationale, and design of the research; a description of 
the target population and the procedures for recruiting participants and eliciting 
informed consent; an explanation of the methods of data collection and analysis; a state-
ment about the risks and benefits for participants, and the strategies for dealing with 
possible physical or psychological distress; copies of the interview questions/question-
naires; and a letter to participants summarizing the information in the ethics application. 
Research ethics policy positions research participants as the "object" of the research 
and assumes that these "subjects" form an identifiable, knowable constituency whose 
members share particular characteristics that distinguish them from others. Self-
starvation resists such comfortable categorization. Anorexia nervosa is classified as a 
psychiatric disorder, but both physical and psychological criteria are used in diagnoses, 
including the maintenance of a very low body weight (less than 85 percent of "normal'' 
for age and height), amenorrhea, fear of fatness, and distorted body image (American 
Psychiatric Association 2000). But self-starvation has shifting, multiple identities and 
assumes different guises at different times, ranging from continued noneating to restricted 
eating with excessive, compulsive exercise to erratic food restriction accompanied by 
binge eating and purging (Polivy and Herman 2002). Biomedical discourse constructs 
self-starvation as an organic disorder and a disease, but the origins and causes of anorexia 
are uncertain and contested. It has been variously explained as a biological pathology, a 
genetic predisposition, an affective disorder, and a cognitive deficit or dysfunction. Psy-
chodynamic and psychoanalytical discourses, on the other hand, constitute anorexia as an 
outcome of a variety of family problems or as a self-pathology that is symptomatic of 
inadequate or unresolved psychosexual and ego development (see Malson 1998, 78-83, 
for a review). 
Biomedical and psychological research explicitly constitutes self-starvation as an 
embodied entity and a distinct pathology that is located within the individual. The 
behaviors attributed to anorexia are positioned as abnormal biological and/or psycho-
logical problems that mark the anorexic as deviant and different from a generalized 
population of "normal" teenage girls. Through her constitution as "other," the anorexic is 
positioned as physically and psychologically unable to act in or to protect her own inter-
ests, thereby justifying medical and psychological intervention to ensure a return to 
"normal" eating behaviors and constructing anorexia as the remit of the medical 
profession. 
Despite the social and cultural power of such discourses, self-starvation has resisted 
colonization into biomedical and psychological categories. Many of the pathologies 
attributed to anorexics, such as erratic, disordered eating and obsessive concerns with 
weight and diet, are typical of many "normal" women; recovered anorexics commonly 
reject biomedical constructions of self-starvation, and many diagnosed anorexics do not 
identify as such, refusing diagnostic classification and medical intervention, and only 
presenting for treatment when pressured by friends or family. Moreover, much of the 
research used to construct anorexia as a biological or psychological problem has been 
based on quantitative research that has been criticized as methodologically flawed, as 
construing causal relationships from correlation analyses, and for generating research 
findings that are inconclusive and/or contradictory (see Malson 1998). 
In contrast, narrative therapy and community psychology constitute anorexia as 
existing outside the self and as having a distinct identity and agency for independent, 
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autonomous action. Interpolating Cartesian mind/body dualism, it is the anorexia that 
takes possession and controls the self, rendering the subject powerless in the face of its 
determined will. The simultaneous disembodiment and personification of anorexia 
removes "the origins of distress from the interior psychological workings of the individual 
person [to] the surrounding environment" (Smail 1994, 6; see also Morgan 1999). In this 
frame the anorexic is constructed as a victim or a casualty of an uncontrollable, mightier 
force that is external to the physical and psychological self, erasing the stigma of pathology 
and exonerating sufferers from the blame attached to the condition. 
Feminist scholars shed a different light on self-starvation by illuminating the multiple 
and contradictory ways that culture is entwined with anorexia. The anorexic body is 
constituted as an expression of social, cultural, political, and gender anxieties; as a meta-
phor for contemporary sociocultural concerns about consumption, personal display, 
feminist politics, and individualistic competitiveness; and as a site of cultural and social 
oppression (e.g., Bordo 1993; Fallon, Katzman, and Wooley 1994). Drawing on feminist 
perspectives, poststructuralist scholars elucidate how everyday discourses of femininity, 
body, and identity are implicated in a range of social institutions and discursive practices 
that conspire to produce women's bodies as anorexic bodies (e.g., Malson 1998). 
Defining the research population is an act of category construction with profound 
intellectual and moral implications. The multiple identities of self-starvation ignited 
sticky dilemmas about how we should describe anorexia nervosa in our ethics application 
and in the information letter to participants. Should it be presented as a ''real" physical or 
psychological condition: a problem, disorder, or illness? Or should it be presented as a 
label or rhetorical device that positions young women as abnormal, deviant, and in need 
of treatment when they defy socially constructed notions of normal, healthy eating 
behaviors? In the light of the differing constitutions of anorexia, how could we establish a 
universal category that neatly defined the participants in our study? Which words should 
we use to address a girl whom clinicians classified as anorexic but who rejected the 
assignation of any medical or psychological problem and saw the label of anorexic as a 
(mis)representation by others? Could we invite her to share her experience ofliving with 
anorexia if she did not believe that she was anorexic? We were anxious to adhere to the 
principle of respect for human subjects, but we worried about how to name those who 
volunteered to participate in our study. To brand a girl anorexic without consent was to 
deny her selfhood-one of the very issues the study aimed to address. To include only 
those girls who acknowledged their diagnosis would affect the research by failing to 
capture the complex spectrum of "anorexic" experiences. 
In part, our problem lay in deciding to listen to the different discourses and bodies of 
research about self-starvation. While our own epistemic faiths might question the merit 
of some of these, we could dismiss neither their potential as a source of insight into 
self-starvation nor the fact that they might echo the different ways that girls viewed self-
starvation and their "condition." 
To help untangle these quandaries, we sought the advice of the institutional ethics 
officers. In Australia, to protect confidentiality and to prevent coercion of ethics commit-
tees, face-to-face discussions between researchers and committees are infrequent. Ethics 
officers are specialists in research ethics policy whose job is to help researchers "solve" 
messy problems before an ethics application is reviewed. The ethics officers were empath-
etic and supportive but uncomprehending: "If you can't lable the population, then the 
research isn't possible." 
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We intended to recruit from specialized treatment clinics for eating disorders where 
many girls had already been diagnosed (labeled) anorexic. The challenge we faced was 
how to describe the study's population so that it accommodated girls' perspectives and 
summoned the essential "anorexic" subject that the ethics officers and research ethics 
policy urged us to find. We considered the possibilities. We could privilege girls' stand-
points by limiting the study to girls who self-identified as anorexic and by excluding girls 
who did not accept their diagnosis. Or we could limit the study to girls diagnosed as 
anorexic. Option 1 (privileging girls' perspectives) risked including girls whose emaci-
ation and eating problems were the result of another, possibly undiagnosed psychiatric or 
biological condition and excluded an important group, namely, girls labeled anorexic who 
rejected the designation. Option 2 (a medical diagnosis) meant privileging the categoriza-
tion imposed by others (doctors) over girls' individual views and experiences. Further, as 
researchers familiar with clinical settings, we knew that a medical diagnosis of anorexia 
nervosa could not create a coherent category of person. Diagnoses were often inconsistent 
and changeable-they rarely met all diagnostic criteria for anorexia nervosa (American 
Psychiatric Association 2000) and were often revised days or weeks later as more informa-
tion unfolded about each sufferer's personal history. At its best, a diagnosis of anorexia 
nervosa was an informed judgment at a particular point in time, but it could not guaran-
tee the definitive, homogenous population that ethics policy and our ethics officers 
invoked us to find. Both options censored the particularity of some girls' experiences, and 
both required us to abandon our sensibility and moral responsibility to some potential 
participants. Both options altered the research focus and our original aim of illuminating 
the full range of experiences among all "anorexic" girls. 
Dissatisfied with these alternatives, we floated the idea of using multiple descriptions to 
address the particularity and diversity of potential participants. One ethics officer flatly 
rejected the idea: "That would mean they're different populations. So you'll need separate 
ethics applications and approvals for each group." The other ethics officers were confused 
and mystified. They could not see the problem that troubled us. The doctors had made 
their diagnoses and issued the decree: "The girls are anorexic. The fact that some girls 
don't agree with their diagnosis doesn't mean they're not anorexic." 
Of course, the easy way forward was to ignore the questions that troubled us. All we had 
to do was fill in the standard ethics review application, prepare generic information 
letters, get the consent forms signed, and start interviewing. While we struggled to con-
struct a more morally acceptable description of the population, our research project 
stalled, our funders got restless, and our colleagues got fractious. We had secured highly 
competitive funding for the research, but this imposed constraints: a tight timeline, 
accountability indicators and reports, the delivery of designated outcomes. Colleagues 
vented their incomprehension and frustration at the delay: "What's the problem? All you 
have to do is fill in the forms and do it." There were no easy answers to our moral tussle, 
and we felt caught in Jacques Derrida's "double bind": an unsolvable dilemma where "one 
can only unbind one of its knots by pulling on the other to make it tighter" (Derrida 1998, 
36). 
Such stalemates nurture compliance. Confronted with abandoning either our anxiety 
or our study, we opted for a compromise by adopting the broadest, most inclusive cat-
egory available: "girls who have received a medical diagnosis of anorexia nervosa." Our 
definition satisfied our ethics committees and enabled the project to proceed-albeit 
with a less inclusive population than we had intended-but it left us uneasy and 
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uncomfortable. Knowing the capriciousness of clinical diagnoses, we worried about the 
intellectual and moral dishonesty of defining the study's population in this way. We were 
also conscious that privileging clinical diagnoses over girls' views and accounts affirmed 
and thereby invisibly reinforced the hegemony of biomedical discourses that construct 
self-starvation as "other." Our positioning as actively complicit in perpetuating this story 
undermined our ethical and moral responsibility to our participants and had troubling 
moral implications for our desired identities as ethical, feminist researchers, although-
ironically-the ethics committees with whom we worked did not share our concerns. We 
hoped the processes for eliciting consent might compensate for the moral difficulties 
raised by our definition of the population, but informed consent carried its own moral 
difficulties. 
Speaking the Unspeakable: The Unknowability of Informed Consent 
Informed consent is a central canon of research ethics policy. The concept of informed 
consent assumes the transparency of a social and psychological reality that enables 
researchers to provide full and accurate information about the research to autonomous 
subjects who are able to make rational, informed choices. In Australia, the national proto-
col for informed consent involves giving participants (usually through an information 
letter) full, comprehensive, and accurate details about the research, including the 
demands, risks, inconveniences, discomforts, and benefits that might be involved. As we 
prepared our ethics application, complexities emerged about each of the four dimensions 
of informed consent, namely, the provision of full information about data collection, 
voluntarism and coercion, physical/psychological distress, and competence to understand 
and participate in the research. 
Our study involved semistructured life-history interviews that sought to illuminate the 
ways that self-starvation shaped participants' lives, relationships, and subjectivity. To 
comply with the ethics policy requirement to provide full information, we dutifully pre-
pared a list of interview questions for potential participants. But semistructured inter-
views are inherently emergent, reflexive, and messy, and the planned focus of an interview 
can easily shift as new issues and accounts emerge. Like all diligent researchers, we cau-
tioned potential participants in the information letters that an interview could take 
unexpected turns and that new questions might arise as girls' narratives raised new 
substantive or theoretical issues. The ethics committees were satisfied that we had fulfilled 
our ethical obligations and provided full, complete, and accurate information about the 
research, but we were less convinced. At best, our warning provided a predication of what 
might happen during an interview. At worst, our assurances were deceptive because they 
created an illusion of a certainty that we could not guarantee. 
The matter of voluntary, noncoercive consent proved trickier than we had imagined. 
The clinics we planned to recruit through were enthusiastic about the research, but we 
were advised that institutional ethics clearance and approval to recruit participants would 
only be granted if the clinicians were coinvestigators in the study. This edict, it was 
explained, was non-negotiable and necessary on the grounds that the girls were under 
clinical care and the clinicians would protect the girls' interests. 
This unexpected requirement created an awkward political predicament by comprom-
ising_ our position as independent researchers who worked in (rather than with) clinics, 
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and put at risk our capacity to report findings that might be critical of the clinics and/ or 
clinical practice. Another, shorter stalemate ensued while we discussed how to handle this 
unexpected turn. We could take the moral high ground and refuse to comply with the 
institutional requirements. Or we could comply and hope to "manage,, the situation. Or 
we could try to negotiate a different arrangement. Option 1 (the moral high ground) 
seemed likely to lead to our being excluded from the clinics and would seriously threaten 
the feasibility of the research. Option 2 (compliance) meant collaborating with the clini-
cians and raised a bevy of uncertainties. Option 3 (negotiation) seemed hopeful but 
reckless. Colleagues urged us to comply, explaining that the clinicians were busy (men) 
who would not interfere if we were agreeable and cooperative. Rather than follow this 
advice and set aside our moral concerns or abandon the potentially positive outcomes of 
the study, we decided to negotiate. There were lengthy, sometimes tense, but ultimately 
successful discussions with the clinicians. Together we developed a strategy to minimize 
the compromises to the study by agreeing that the original team would be responsible for 
the project design and implementation, and that we would work together to review the 
data analysis and to develop ways to use girls' perspectives and accounts to inform and to 
improve clinical practice. The alliance has been productive and mutually supportive and 
has resulted in valuable changes in clinical practice. 
The positive outcome to our political quandary did not remove the implications for 
participants that might flow from an alliance with the clinicians. A precondition of 
informed consent is that it is voluntarily and freely given. The concept of free will is 
premised on an autonomous liberal humanist subject who is able to make rational and 
independent judgments regardless of her context. Here the ontological difficulties are the 
presumption of a stable, decontextualized subject and the discounting of the multiple 
power relations that work visibly and invisibly to constitute the subject and her inter-
action with others (Foucault 1977, 1988). We worried whether genuine informed consent 
was possible given the clinicians' connection with the research. To what extent could girls 
exercise agency given their subordinate position in the world they cohabited with the 
clinicians? As patients, might the girls read the clinicians' association with the study as 
coercive or as an inappropriate incentive to participate? Would girls resist participating in 
the study to irk the physicians or attribute greater importance to participating out of a 
misplaced perception that it might please their doctors? Would the girls hesitate to share 
their stories given the clinicians' involvement? Could girls feel able to voice concerns 
about their treatment given their subordination to the doctors' authority in the clinic? 
The third obligation under the principle of informed consent is to provide information 
about the potential for psychological distress or discomfort. The risk of distress is gener-
ally considered minimal when the probability and magnitude of harm are not greater 
"than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine 
physical or psychological examinations or tests" (Santelli et al. 1995, 274). Yet how indi-
viduals experience distress can be uncertain and disguised, and predicting the potential 
for distress can be difficult (Latvala, Janhonen, and Moring 1998). Although a growing 
body of evidence suggests that qualitative research poses little risk of distress and that 
telling your story to an interested listener has emotional and therapeutic value (Kleinman 
1988; Corbin and Morse 2003), the individual histories of anorexic girls suggested that the 
interviews might revive distressing, secreted traumas. These girls were more likely than 
the general population to have experienced stressful life events such as the death of a 
close relative or family breakup or to have experienced depression, low self-esteem, and 
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concerns about identity and control. Clinical literature has postulated relationships 
between anorexia and a range of family problems, including enmeshed, critical, or 
coercive family environments; insecure attachment; and physical and sexual abuse in 
families (see Polivy and Herman 2002 for a review). Although some of this research has 
been questioned (e.g., Eisler 1995), we could not ignore the possibility that the biograph-
ies of some girls might encompass complex, difficult family relationships. Nor could we 
ignore the possibility that distress might be triggered by the accumulation of painful 
experiences associated with self-starvation: multiple, long-term hospital admissions; 
repeated, failed clinical interventions; physical self-harm, including attempted suicide; 
and extended separation from education, work, friendships, and social interaction. 
Given the biography of self-starvation, even distributing an interview protocol in the 
interest of informed consent carried the possibility of resurrecting upsetting or deeply 
troubling past memories. Yet ethics policy and privacy legislation prevented us from 
accessing information that might tell us about the best way of interacting with particular 
participants. Given the situated chronicles of girls' lives, we worried that acquiescing to a 
''one-size-fits-all" strategy abdicated our moral and social responsibilities to our potential 
participants. 
Self-starvation also problematizes the question of competence to provide informed 
consent. Under Australian law, young people under the age of majority are considered 
competent to participate in research without parental consent if they understand the 
procedures and implications of research. Relevant to any decision about waiving parental 
consent is the level of risk involved in the research (Brooks-Gunn and Rotheram-Borus 
1994; Levine 1995; Rew, Taylor-Seehafer, and Thomas 2000). In practice, ethics commit-
tees set nominal ages at which they consider adolescents capable of independently 
consenting to participate in research. Each of the ethics committees involved with our 
multisite study set different age barriers for consent, ranging from fourteen to sixteen years. 
Age barriers for adolescent consent have been hotly contested (e.g., Brooks-Gunn and 
Rotheram-Borus 1994; Brody and Waldron 2000). Research indicates that young people 
(fourteen years and older) have a capacity to understand research and make decisions 
similar to that of adults (Meade and Slesnick 2002) but may be affected by lack of 
experience or by emotionality (Dorn, Susman, and Fletcher 1995) and have trouble 
understanding the different goals of therapy and research (Brody and Waldron 2000). 
Some evidence also indicates that acute malnutrition can cause temporary cognitive 
impairment and that anorexic patients below a certain weight are unable to participate 
effectively in treatment (e.g., Bruch 1988) or, by implication, to provide informed consent. 
The capacity of adolescents to reason and to make decisions about the risks and benefits 
of participating in research can also be limited by stress. Hospitalization and the physical 
and psychological symptoms of anorexia can be stressful, and anorexics have a higher 
than average likelihood of experiencing problems like anxiety disorders, obsessive-
compulsive disorders, and depression that can inhibit the ability to make informed 
choices about participating in research. These considerations may not be relevant in every 
case of self-starvation, but the different age limits set by ethics committees obliged us to 
treat all potential participants under the age of sixteen years (the maximum, nominal age 
limit identified by our ethics committees) as lacking decision-making capacity and need-
ing parental protection and consent to participate in research. 
Parental consent, however, is not a panacea for the ethical difficulties of consent. The 
tacit assumption underpinning the idea of parental consent is that parents know what is 
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in the best interests of their daughters and are capable of protecting their interests. 
Parents, however, are likely to be positioned in similar power relations as their daughters 
with regard to the medical team and could be influenced to provide consent by a hope 
that participating in the research could help their daughters (Brody and Waldron 2000). 
Although the imbrication of families in self-starvation is a complex and contested area, 
difficult family relationships or histories could affect the decision of some parents to give 
or to withhold consent. Parental consent is a double-edged sword, protecting some girls 
and erasing other girls' potential for agency by increasing the opportunity for parental 
coercion. 
We presented our case for relinquishing age barriers and parental consent to the insti-
tutional ethics officers, but they advised that all ethics committees were immovable on 
these issues. The concern was not with the legitimacy of the arguments we presented but 
with the financial threat of a litigious parent or caregiver. With no option but to acquiesce 
on this count, we circumvented the restrictions imposed by our committees by using a 
different form of consent involving "ongoing consensual decision-making" (Ramos 1989, 
60) before, during, and after the interviews so that participants had repeated opportun-
ities to withdraw or to qualify consent. This strategy could not guarantee the knowability 
of informed consent or obviate unseen power relations, but it offered a greater degree of 
empowerment by providing girls with multiple opportunities to qualify and negotiate 
their involvement in the research. 
II. Ethics in our Narrative 
The Knotty Problem of Universalism and the Essentialized Subject 
The ethics framework that regulates Western research and guides the decision making of 
ethics committees is based on the concept of a universalized rational subject and an ethic 
of justice derived from Kantian moral theory. The presumption of the universalized 
subject takes for granted that the experiences of the dominant social group can be general-
ized and taken as true for all others. In this frame, consensus about moral behavior and 
ethical practice is unproblematic because all rational subjects will acknowledge that the 
agreed universal moral principles are in the interests of all subjects. 
Research ethics policy combines Kantian rationalism with the social contract theories 
of liberal philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Rawls. In the contrac-
tarian model of social relations any ethical and moral problem can be resolved by using 
the liberal principles of equality, fairness, and reciprocity, and a public system of rights 
and responsibilities in the form of laws, procedures, and protocols (Benhabib 1987, 85). 
Margaret Walker describes the progeny of Kantian rationalism and social contract theory 
as the theoretical-juridical model of ethical theory, comprising "a set of law-like moral 
principles or procedures" that are transhistorical, transcultural, and couched in the lan-
guage of scientific objectivity to appear dispassionate and authorative (1997, 36). 
Ethics committees grew out of a positivist tradition of biomedical research that evolved 
in tandem with the theoretical-juridical model of ethics. Positivist research takes for 
granted the existence of a putative knowable reality, and that objective, universal truths 
can be revealed through empirical sdentific data collection and explicit, trans-
parent, experimental research operations and procedures (Harre and Secord 1972). The 
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conceptual foundation of positivism has been widely challenged, but its assumptions 
continue to underpin the philosophy and processes embedded in regulatory frameworks 
for research ethies, particularly when biomedical agencies have an influential role in 
developing and monitoring ethics policy and practice. 
The positivist biomedical model of research ethics has had exceptional discursive power 
and has been taken up and imposed on disciplines such as the social sciences and human-
ities, even when these disciplines employ radically different epistemic frames and forms of 
data collection and analysis. The widespread infiltration of the positivist model of 
research ethics has worked to visibly and invisibly inscribe the management, surveillance, 
and control of research ethics in ways that appear natural, benign, and eminently reason-
able to "any rational subject." Most researchers accept the requirement (if not the desir-
ability) of ethics review before research commences. Yet the biomedical model also casts 
research ethics in a shroud of scientific neutrality and universal certainty that crafts an 
illusion that ethics approval means ethical research, begetting a compliance approach to 
research ethics and to the ways that researchers think through ethical questions. 
The presumption of a universalized, rational subject that is at the heart of Kantian 
moral theory and modern research ethics policy is inherently problematic because it 
constructs the self as disembedded and disembodied, without sensibilities, history, or 
physicality. All research projects face the challenge of finding the "generalized subject" 
who describes the research population. The theoretical and practical difficulties of this 
task are rarely openly paraded and discussed, and the task is rarely as problematic as in 
our narrative. Fewer difficulties arise, for example, in defining the population for a 
research project about the life histories of "schoolgirls." But the embodiment of self-
starvation is both profound and ambiguous; different discourses attach conflicting mean-
ings to the anorexic body (and mind), and the biography of self-starvation is singular and 
diverse at the same time. Our experiences highlighted the difficulties of constructing a 
definitive, universal category of the anorexic subject and threw into sharp relief the 
illusion of the universal subject of Kantian discourse. 
The problems of consent illuminated the gulf between the embodied singularity of 
research participants and the disembodied, humanist subject of the ethic of justice and 
positivist research. An amalgam of legal edicts (e.g., privacy legislation) and local practices 
by ethics committees (e.g., prohibition of any contact between researchers and partici-
pants before written consent is given) curtail researchers' capacity to engage with and 
learn about research participants before beginning the research. These constraints were 
designed to protect participants and to prevent coercion. At the same time, they prevent 
researchers and potential participants from developing the personal relationships that 
make it possible to address the diverse singularity of research participants in the design of 
a research project and in research ethics protocols. 
Erasing the singularity of research participants has grave moral implications. Public 
conversations about self-starvation, the anorexic body, and the anorexic subject have been 
dominated by voices of doctors, psychologists, medical researchers, sociologists, and fem-
inists. Following Carol Gilligan (1982) and Sandra Harding (1987), a primary aim of our 
study was to bring girls' standpoints into these public discussions and to open up new 
theoretical possibilities by hearing the voices and silences smothered by the conversations 
of others. The definition of the research population offered to our ethics committees 
satisfied their expectations and requirements, but it narrowed the research focus by 
excluding a range of potential participants (e.g., girls who rejected their diagnosis) and 
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(re)configured the study's aim to illuminate the diversity among all "anorexic" teenage 
girls. The result was a disconcerting paradox: the act of defining the research population 
erased the particular and individual differences among potential participants, ignoring 
"the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans" (Benhabib 
1987, 81) and, in doing so, disregarded one of the four fundamental principles of human-
ist research ethics policy-respect for persons. 
Power, Politics, and the Embodiment of Self and "Others" 
Power and politics are inextricably entwined with research ethics. The legal requirement 
to receive ethics committee approval to conduct research in ways that are acceptable to 
ethics committees (and to ethics officers) explicitly subordinates researchers to the author-
ity of research committees. The ethics approval process also creates a hierarchical power 
relationship between researchers and participants when it constructs researchers as object-
ive, dispassionate scientists with the knowledge and expertise to reveal "truths" about 
their research "subjects." Bestowing such an identity positions researchers as superior to 
their participants, who become the less knowledgeable, passive "objects" of the research 
and of the researcher. In the case of anorexia, assigning a differential status to researchers 
and participants through the ethics process replicates the power relations, politics, and 
public discourses that disempower anorexic girls by constituting self-starvation as differ-
ent, deviant, and other. When researchers acquiesce to the requirements and interpret-
ations imposed by ethics committees, they are drawn into a position that is vulnerable to 
perpetuating and reinscribing the hegemonic discourses and practices that construct 
anorexic girls as other. In this way, the ethics process reconfigures the aim of the research 
in unintended ways and overlooks questions of moral and ethical responsibility to 
research subjects in favor of conformity with normative protocols and practices. 
Historically, feminists have directed their attention to the colonizing power of dis-
courses about gender, race, and class and to the ways these subjugate and exclude particu-
lar groups by constituting them as other. For feminists, the priority has been to show how 
discourses and practices usurp the rights and capacities of "others" to speak (and act) for 
themselves by authorizing different voices (e.g., fathers, politicians, lawyers and courts, 
welfare agencies) to speak in their stead. In Australia, Aboriginal Australians, historically 
the nation's most marginalized social group, have fought hard to be recognized and to be 
appointed to research ethics committees so that indigenous people have a say in research 
ethics. Our experiences illuminate the extent to which the ethics process constructs and 
silences individuals and social groups, and the extent to which the ethics process can 
shackle researchers' efforts to interrupt or transform the conditions that perpetuate the 
assignation of particular groups as other. 
The (im)possibilities of Becoming an Ethical Researcher 
The explicit purpose of ethics policy is to summon into being ethical research and ethical 
researchers. Yet corridor conversations and conference banter among researchers are often 
sprinkled with rumblings about ethics committees. A common complaint is that the 
ethics approval process is an intrusive, onerous obligation that delays (or obstructs) the 
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"real" work of research. In such conversations, ethics committees and researchers are 
invariably positioned as binary opposites: powerful versus powerless, dictatorial versus 
subjugated, rigid and dogmatic versus flexible and responsive, methodologically ignorant 
versus methodologically knowledgeable. Reflective ethics and moral action are forestalled 
when researchers see "ethics" as a barrier, rather than a facilitator, to ethical research. 
Researchers' discomfort with the ways that ethics processes can position researchers as 
other than ethical is evidenced by the imperative researchers feel to find new ways of 
doing ethical research-implementing post hoc strategies to circumvent difficulties with 
prescribed ethics procedures, abandoning research that cannot "fit" the rules or interpret-
ations of ethics committees, constructing elaborate justifications for processes that deviate 
from the interpretation of ethics policy by local committees, or paying only lip service to 
the ethics review process. 
We incorporated strategies in our recruitment and consent procedures to try to address 
our complicity in the othering of anorexic girls. In itself, this act illustrates the moral 
circularity of trying to be ethical researchers and comply with the protocols of ethics 
policy and practice. Developing consent processes that were morally responsive to the 
singularity of self-starvation meant thinking outside the existing protocols, endeavoring 
to connect with relational sensibility to the concrete "otherness" of the girls who might be 
in our study, and then recrafting our understanding of the girls in a realist epistemology 
and language that fit the ethics regulations and the expectations of our ethics committees. 
Although our ethics committees endorsed the outcome, we were struck by the irony that 
the intellectual work of caring about participants within an ethic of justice involved 
(momentarily) relinquishing all conceptual links with formal ethics procedures and 
expectations. 
The positivist biomedical model casts research ethics as a decontextualized set of prin-
ciples and procedures for all scenarios, in which researchers are seen as disembodied and 
dispassionate scientists who are disengaged and removed from the ethics process. Yet our 
narrative showed that research ethics is deeply embedded and implicated in the social 
context. Factors like project timelines, the requirements of funding bodies, the local 
practices of different ethics committees, personal relationships in the research setting and 
with ethics officers and committees, and ethics committees' anxiety about litigation all 
play a potent, if sometimes mute, role in decisions about ethics. Researchers are embodied 
in the ethical process: meeting and negotiating with ethics officers and others in the 
research setting; refining the research design to address ethical issues; writing and rewrit-
ing ethics applications; and wrestling with decisions that kindle an array of intersecting 
emotions, including discomfort, anxiety, relief, anticipation, optimism, and hope. The 
practice of decontextualizing and disembodying ethics occludes the investments 
researchers bring to "getting through" the ethics process and the role these processes can 
play in privileging particular voices and eroding the relationship between participants and 
researchers. 
Our narrative foregrounds some of the tensions researchers encounter in trying to take 
up an identity as an ethical researcher in a regulated framework of research ethics. The 
rigid prescription or interpretation of ethics policy can affect the design of research, 
undermining its value and nurturing inadequate or even poor research. Nor does compli-
ance with the edicts of ethics committees guarantee moral decision making or moral 
action. Derrida (1990) cautions that unqualified compliance with laws and· regulations 
cr~ates the very thing they were designed to avert: people relating to each other instru-
Unraveling Ethics 135 
mentally. The ethics approval process confronts a similar difficulty because it is "designed 
in terms of the greatest good for the greatest number. [The ethics process is] useful to refer 
to, but (it is] not necessarily humane or even just in every_situation because [it] perpetu-
ate[s] tension between the universal and the particular" (Byrne Armstrong and Horsfall, 
forthcoming). 
Our experiences suggest that research ethics policy and processes provide guidance but 
not definitive solutions to questions about ethical research and moral behavior. Rather, 
formulaic rules and practices are vulnerable to nurturing unethical and amoral behaviors 
whereby researchers pay lip service to the ethics approval process knowing they have 
committed to processes that are conceptually flawed or impossible to implement. In such 
a climate, the ethics process fosters deception and cultures of counterfeit practice, destroy-
ing the very thing it seeks to create: ethical research. 
Dreaming the (im)possible Dream: Imagining Future Possibilities 
The epistemic tensions between the discourses of the universal, rational subject of scien-
tific realism and those of the multidimensional, particular, and social subject of interpret-
ative, qualitative research create messy moral dilemmas. Despite the advances of recent 
decades, feminist research straddles a prickly divide in trying to craft research to fit ethics 
policies and practices when ethics committees employ a biomedical model of research and 
when dialogue between researchers and ethics committees is constrained. 
Rather than succumb to the normalizing power of the ethics process, feminists have 
challenged the notion of research ethics as a codelike set of rules that regulates moral 
action (e.g., Gilligan 1977; Benhabib 1992), and researchers have urged reform of the 
processes for approving qualitative research (Parker 1990; Corbin and Morse 2003). 
Some ethics committees have developed more sophisticated, flexible understandings of 
interpretive research practice, often as a result of struggles over the kinds of issues we 
raise and by appointing knowledgeable practitioners of interpretive research to ethics 
committees. Yet many committees continue to use the same criteria to judge inter-
pretative and positivist research, reluctant to relinquish the (illusionary) comfort 
that complying with research ethics means ethical research (see Corbin and Morse 2003, 
335-36). 
Feminists have challenged Kantian rationalism as a basis for ethical and moral action 
and proposed an ethic of care and responsibility as an alternative to the universal subject 
and the explicit separation of self and others embedded in an ethic of justice. Gilligan 
(1977) has argued that an ethic of care involves fundamentally different moral concepts 
than an ethic of justice. It comprises a morality based on responsibility and relationships 
rather than rights and rules, is grounded in concrete circumstances rather than abstrac-
tions, and is expressed as an" activity of care" rather than as a set of rules. 
Despite the challenges posed in our narratives, we are reluctant to relinquish the idea of 
an ethics approval process given the long history of researchers denying, abusing, or 
sacrificing the rights and interests of subjects in the name of knowledge, science, and 
research. We are also hesitant about an ethic of care in the absence of a moral framework. 
Such a model presumes the knowability of the "other"; is susceptible to being reduced to a 
vague, unruly form of empathy; and, as Joan Tronto (1999, 113) points out, makes a claim 
for a morality based on subjectivity that is vulnerable to relativism or solipsism. 
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Feminists have proposed that discourse ethics offers a way forward through a morality 
based on the interdependence of a care ethic and justice, whereby specific cases and 
claims in particular contexts can be considered within a framework of moral principles 
(Benhabib 1992). Such an approach would draw on justice principles to guide decision 
making but would accommodate multiple epistemologies; consider the specificity of indi-
vidual cases in particular contexts; take both difference and a sensibility to the embedded 
and embodied particularity of participants and researchers as central to ethical decision 
making; include processes to encourage and nurture dialogue among researchers, partici-
pants, and ethics committees; and constitute ethics as an ongoing process of critical 
reflection, action, and accountability throughout the research rather than as an act of 
compliance and approval at the beginning of the research. 
In our vague imaginings-our partial dream-the research ethics process would 
become an ongoing collaborative process shaped by dialogue and responsive relationships 
that are guided (but not dictated) by principles of justice. Thinking of research ethics as a 
continual process of collaboration would open up opportunities to dissolve the (mis)-
conception that ethics approval means ethical research; to erase the differential power 
relationships among researchers, ethics committees, and participants; and to interrupt the 
mechanisms that make researchers and research complicit in the "othering" of research 
participants. 
Ill. Conclusion 
The aim of our narratives is to make visible, and therefore revisable, the dilemmas that 
surround research ethics policies and their implementation by ethics committees and the 
implications these carry for research participants and for researchers. The multiple con-
stitutions of self-starvation and the embedded and embodied diversity of "anorexic" girls 
erase the assumptions that a research population is a homogenous constituency and that 
informed consent is a conceptually coherent or morally painless act. Rather, the universal, 
rational subject of an ethic of justice is an illusionary desire, and complying with research 
ethics processes does not necessarily mean that the ethics processes respect the singularity 
of participants. Our narratives illuminate how sensibility to power relations, biographical 
pathways and life experiences, and the identities of the researchers and participants-the 
"others" of ethics policy-can be obliterated in a compliance model of research ethics and 
how the research context and institutional structures and practices can fashion ethical 
decisions and moral actions that curtail sensitivity to "others" and constrain the possibil-
ity and practice of feminist research. 
The dual aims of research ethics policy are to respect and protect research participants, 
on the one hand, and to cultivate ethical researchers, on the other. Yet when prescribed 
ethics protocols fail to engage with the concrete lives and work of participants and 
researchers, the policy and practice of research ethics functions to construct both 
researchers and participants as contrary to, different from, and other to its aims. Our 
narratives illuminate that writing an application for ethics committee review is not a 
simple or straightforward process. It entangles researchers in tricky moral decisions 
around complying with the ethics process, appearing to be an ethical researcher, and being 
an ethical researcher. The decision making involved in preparing ethics ·applications 
positions researchers in an awkward moral space between compliance and defiance, legal 
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and transgressive action, instrumentality and sensibility to others. In this space, the rules 
are unclear, but the moral risks are high. 
We do not aim or pretend to offer a definitive solution to the concerns raised in our 
narratives. Nor do we underestimate the difficulties of transforming established, insti-
tutionalized ethics processes, particularly if there are vested interests in protecting and 
preserving the status quo. Our point is political. Despite advances in the theorizing and 
practice of feminist research, it is easy to underestimate or to fail to see the ways in which 
the social, organizational, and cultural practices of the research ethics process work as 
conceptual and concrete barriers that impede feminist research approaches and position 
feminist researchers in ideologically uncomfortable spaces. It is equally easy to under-
estimate the extent to which we, knowingly and unknowingly, take up locations in these 
uncomfortable spaces and, in doing so, become complicit in preserving the very things 
our work seeks to erode. 
Foucault argued that ethics is not based on or constrained by any legal or religious 
system but evolves from reflectivity and is indivisible from the self and an aesthetic of 
existence (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982). The formal conventions of the ethics review 
process do not exempt researchers from sensibility to the particular, embedded, and 
embodied "others" or from doing the intellectual work of reflexively analyzing the ethics 
and morality of their decisions or actions. Nor do they erase the political imperative for 
feminist researchers to lead the way in developing better processes for ethical decision 
making and moral action in research. 
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1. A major point in our essay is that anorexia is a contested category and anorexic is a problematic label, particularly 
from girls' standpoints. For this reason we are using the terms anorexic and anorexia provisionally and tentatively, in 
the absence of better words. 
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